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Unionbusting has traditionally been a dirty business,
dominated by consultants, law firms, and private guards
conducting scorched-earth campaigns against unions in
strikes and National Labor Relations Board ( NLRB)
elections. It still is.
But just as unions have begun a period of transformation, becoming more committed to organizing and better at it, unionbusting has expanded. The state of the art now includes sophisticated efforts to forestall organizing drives by creating company-dominated organizations in the workplace and by |
manipulating demographics to create a "union-proof"work
force. Whole industries are now contracted out, so that
workers, in the eyes of the law, are no longer even the
direct employees of the corporations that nevertheless
control their lives.
Two years ago, the highest profile union organizing group in the country, Justice for Janitors, met some of this new corporate thinking head-on. Having previously organized most janitors in California's Silicon Valley and neighboring Alameda County, Service Employees International Union (SEIU) Local 1877, one of the |
country's fastest-growing unions, moved its organizing
crew to Sacramento, the state capital. Its target was
Somers Building Maintenance, a key employer with large
and profitable contracts to clean state buildings and
the facilities of major corporations, including
Hewlett-Packard.
After winning workers' support, Local 1877 asked Somers to recognize the union based on a check of authorization cards. The company refused. Within weeks, an ex-supervisor and the wife of another supervisor began going through Hewlett-Packard buildings at night,collecting signatures for the Couriers and |
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Service
Employees Local 1, a little-known union not affiliated
with the AFL-CIO. Somers quickly recognized Local 1,
signed a contract with no wage increases, and began
giving preferential treatment to workers affiliated with
the company union. Meanwhile, workers claiming to be
Local 1 representatives threatened Local 1877
supporters; two workers were attacked and beaten.
Eventually, the NLRB issued a complaint, calling Local 1 a company union. Somers settled the charge and kicked the organization out. Somers' company union marked a new and sophisticated |
effort to defeat one of today's unions most successful
strategies typified by Justice for Janitors'
campaigns.Many union observers credit the effort to the
West Coast's premier anti-union law firm, Littler,
Mendelssohn, Fastiff and Tichy, ranked No. 2 on a
national list of unionbusters maintained by the AFL-CIO.
The firm is the largest specifically anti-labor law firm
in the country, with 270 attorneys in 20 cities, and
revenues of $72 million in 1995.
Somers and Littler tried to find a weak point in Justice for Janitors' campaign strategy, which rallies |
many-sided pressures on building owners. Union
organizers build community coalitions to mount boycotts,
document violations of worker protection laws, and file
barrages of court actions. Union members and supporters
conduct rallies, demonstrations, and sit-ins, often
using civil disobedience to back up organizing efforts.
But at Somers, while SEIU Local 1877 mounted pressure from outside the workplace, the company used Local 1 to create a climate of fear among the workers themselves. Those who supported the company union were given better treatment,and some were even chosen as stewards. |

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Somers
created a small core of employees who identified
strongly with the company, while supporters of Local
1877 had to fight just to keep their jobs.
Somers found another ally in Rep. Pete Hoekstra (R-Mich.), who held hearings of the House government oversight committee to push a longer-term Republican agenda entirely barring corporate campaign tactics such as those used by Justice for Janitors. Marlene Somsak, a public relations spokesperson for Hewlett-Packard, referred to the campaign as "the use of neutral parties as battlegrounds." |
OFF WITH ITS HEAD Employers and their political allies want to force union organizing drives back into the legal process of NLRB elections, while the whole Justice for Janitors strategy is an effort to avoid them.That says a lot about how distorted the legal system has become. "Sometimes I think the National Labor Relations Act should be repealed," comments AFL-CIO Organizing Director Richard Bensinger bitterly. "What could be worse than this?" Joe Uehlein, past secretary of the AFL-CIO's Industrial Union Department and now director of its Department of Strategic |
Campaigns, points out that classic
unionbusting has always been reactive. Employers respond
both to the prospect that workers might organize a union
and to the specific tactics unions use. "We set the
battlefield; they have to react to it," he
asserts."That's why they want to make us deal with the
NLRB. They control that process, and they know how to
win using it."
And win they do. Unions lose about half the NLRB elections, and more in larger companies than smaller ones. Even worse, they win contracts with only half of the companies where workers vote for union representation. |

| Bensinger explains that "NLRB elections force unions into a propaganda war in which they have to convince workers that life can be better in the future if they're organized." Management has a full array of weapons. Using a barrage of legal tactics, anti-union law firms try to carve out a bargaining unit of workers with a minimum of union support. They delay elections as long as possible to give management a chance to reverse union support through intense, one-on-one conversations with supervisors. In captive audience meetings that workers are forced to attend, management issues threats and promises and asks for "a second chance." Unionbusters show videos depicting violent strikes, |
while carefully-coached management representatives tell
workers they'll have to strike if the union wins.
"In the meantime, the union is excluded from the workplace entirely and has no way of stopping illegal activity before the voting takes place," Bensinger says. "The fact is, workers don't really have the right to organize unions." Unionbusting consultants have thrived as the legal process has grown more and more skewed. When Local 2850 |
of the Hotel and Restaurant Employees Union (HERE) began its organizing drive at the Lafayette Park Hotel in an upper class San Francisco suburb, hotel managers brought in the American Consulting Group (ACG, No. 31 on the AFL-CIO list).In short order, the hotel fired two of the most active union supporters and laid the necessary bedrock of any anti-union campaign: fear. Nationally, the AFL-CIO estimates that one in ten workers participating in a union organizing campaign is fired."Preemption is the unionbusters' philosophy,"explains Local 2850 President Jim Dupont. "Their approach is `take the head off before it has a chance to grow.'" |
| When the Lafayette Park fired Socorro Zapien, management undoubtedly knew she was a union supporter. According to Dupont, the hotel had sent a spy to union meetings. The hotel denied the charge to the NLRB. She was accused of taking a chocolate bar, a charge she denied, and going early to her coffee break. Zapien had no previous disciplinary record. Nevertheless, the NLRB refused to demand that the hotel rehire her. The board follows the Riteline decision, which says that if there is any business reason unrelated to union activity for a firing, no matter how unlikely, termination is legal. Even if the board does finally order |
reinstatement, the
process can take years and workers have already learned
the price for supporting the union.
At the Lafayette Park Hotel, the firings were combined with raises and increases in benefits. Unions suspect that ACG consultants trained supervisors to identify and isolate pro-union workers, pressured the undecided, and helped form anti-union employee committees standard unionbuster tactics during NLRB election campaigns. "After all that, there was no way we could have a fair election there," Dupont says. | Local 2850 countered with an increasingly common step among unions that find the NLRB process fails to protect workers or to penalize employers for illegal action: It turned to direct pressure. HERE organized pickets and enlisted immigrant rights activists and religious supporters to march against the hotel. It also announced a boycott. Weddings, parties, and conferences were canceled, either in solidarity or because of the unattractive atmosphere. The union spread its activity to two other northern California hotels owned by the same company. This is just the kind of campaign that Rep. Hoekstra and congressional Republicans are trying to ban through legislation. |
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ACG responded with extensive public relations work to
undermine the boycott. It pressured city council members
to pass a city ordinance (later found unconstitutional)
against the marches, and tried to restrict the union
through injunctions against the union's free speech and
direct action tactics. ACG also brought in another
consultant, Lupe Cruz, to deal with the mostly Latina,
immigrant work force.
The Lafayette Park Hotel campaign is still going on. Unions adopting this approach have to have a long-term |
commitment. But it often succeeds where the NLRB process
fails. After a similar four-year fight by Local 2 at San
Francisco's Parc 55 Hotel, management gave in and signed
a contract.
BLOOD & GUTS STRIKEBREAKERS |
baptized in fire in 1983 in the bitter Arizona copper miners'
strike at Phelps Dodge. That two-year-long strike was
"really the start of the modern process of permanent
replacement of strikers by scabs," according to Joe
Uehlein. "We still haven't, as a movement, understood
its impact, much less recovered from it."
Since Phelps Dodge, the list of companies hiring scabs to break strikes is a roll call of the major class battles of the 1980s and 1990s: Continental Airlines, Eastern Airlines, International Paper, Greyhound, Caterpillar, Hormel, Watsonville Canning and Frozen Foods, Diamond Walnut, |
| Pittston, Wheeling-Pittsburgh, USX, and many others. Not all of these battles have been won by employers, but the pattern of attack is basically the same. In 1995, management of the Detroit News, owned by Gannett Publications, and the Detroit Free Press, owned by Knight-Ridder, put demands on the table to replace cost-of-living raises with merit increases and to replace union jobs with non-union positions. Knowing the terms would be unacceptable to unions and hoping for a strike, they made arrangements with national consulting firms and with the local police. Four months before the strike, the Detroit Newspaper Agency, a joint operation of both newspapers to |
share production and distribution
facilities, promised to compensate the Sterling Heights
Police Department for overtime costs from shepherding
scabs into the plant. By the time the strike was a year
old, the newspapers had paid out $2.1 million.
The newspapers also lined up hired guns to handle scabs, legal affairs, PR, and security. A good-sized industry of such support institutions exists. One of the largest companies specializing in providing replacement workers, BE&K, maintains a data bank with the names of hundreds |
of workers who travel the country from strike to strike.
The newspapers contracted with one of BE&K's rivals,
Alternative Work Force (AWF), for 580 scabs. They also
brought in the veteran anti-union law firm of King and
Ballow (No. 29 on the AFL-CIO list). This company
has masterminded a series of newspaper wars in Chicago,
Pittsburgh, New York, and San Francisco, among other
cities. Standard legal strategy during strikes rests on
convincing friendly judges to issue injunctions to
virtually eliminate picketing, so that scabs can pass
freely in and out.
To guard the scabs, the newspapers |
| first hired Huffmaster Security, another company which, like AWF, has made lots of money in the newspaper wars. In the first four months of the strike, Huffmaster and AWF were paid $2.3 million for supplying 480 guards and 580 scabs. Huffmaster, which is suing the papers for $1.6 million more, was replaced by a larger, even more notorious, security firm, Vance International, whose guards sport black uniforms and combat boots. The effect is startling, as Cleveland teachers learned in fall 1996 while they prepared to strike. "When uniformed out-of-state security forces invaded a Cleveland high school ... complete with shields, bulletproof |
vests, cots, and in some cases sidearms, we now realize that
the education of Cleveland children [was] the last
thought on the minds of the state officials running
strike preparations," commented Ohio State
Representative Vermel M. Whalen.
Nor is the menacing image purely for show. In Detroit, 20 Vance guards beat striker Vito Sciuto with a stick, breaking his skull. In comments to a reporter afterwards, a Vance employee said the guards wanted "to hurt people." |
This reputation makes money for Vance; its 1995
strikebreaking activity grossed $90 million of the $25
billion private security industry. But its real
success, according to company founder Chuck Vance, lies
in its use of video cameras. During the strike at the
Pittston Coal Co., for instance, Vance collected
thousands of hours of videotapes. Courts hostile to
miners in the coalfields used the tapes to justify $64
million in fines against the United Mine Workers, fines
later overturned by the Supreme Court.
The tapes are also useful after a strike is over to |
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ensure that active union members are not rehired and
BE&K's data bank has thenames of hundreds of potential scabs who travel the country from strike to strike. that "troublemakers" are dealt with. While there is |
basically no punishment for companies if scabs threaten or injure strikers, the NLRB has held that any striker who threatens scabs, or even insults them, can be fired. When the United Auto Workers struck Caterpillar in Peoria, Illinois, Vance's Asset Protection Team pushed and shoved strikers and family members in order to provoke confrontations it could video. Guards followed strikers to their homes.Caterpillar striker Ron Heller monitored a police radio conversation mentioning a list of "troublemakers."In later legal action, he uncovered records that indicate Vance supplied a list of active union members to local police. |
The results, so far, have pleased the management of the
Detroit papers. Frank Vega, CEO of Detroit Newspaper
Agency, said "we would have waited three or four more
contracts to get to where this strike has gotten us."
THE MODERNCOMPANY UNION |

Although it is increasingly difficult for worker to win NLRB-administered elections,
these Poin St. George, California fish packing plant employees get their union, 1989.
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to block
union organizing before it starts. The Hyatt Hotel in
Sacramento has set up peer review committees where
workers can go with problems they can't resolve with
their supervisors. The committees consist of two
supervisors and three employees chosen by the aggrieved
worker from a list of employees who have gone through
conflict resolution training. The important part of this
process, according to HERE 2850's Dupont, is that"it
creates the semblance of justice."In other words, it
seems like workers don't need a union to resolve their
problems.
After General Electric defeated a union drive at its Mattoon, |
Illinois plant in 1991, it hired Caras and
Associates of Columbia, Maryland, to set up similar peer
reviews. The strategy, designed to stave off a second
unionizing effort, also insulated the company from
discrimination complaints. "Once [government]
investigators see the peer review approach," noted GE
specialist Jack Hoffman, "they usually don't even go
through the paperwork."
Peer review committees are only a small part of a much larger picture. Modern personnel practices in large corporations try to inoculate workers against the idea of |
organizing or taking sides against management. This
sophisticated unionbusting strategy is a modern-day
version of company unionism.
Much of this strategy was developed in Silicon Valley during the Cold War. From the beginning, high-tech workers have faced an industry-wide, anti-union policy. Robert Noyce, who helped invent the transistor and later became a co-founder of Intel Corp., declared that "remaining non-union is an essential for survival for most of our companies. ... This is a very high priority for management here." |
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Expanding electronics plants were laboratories for
personnel-management techniques for maintaining a
"union-free environment." These techniques, which
focused on the team method for organizing workers, were
later used against unions in other industries, from
auto-manufacturing to steel-making.
Silicon Valley hearings of the Commission on the Future of Labor Management Relations, the Dunlop Commission,held in January of 1994, gave the public a first-hand look at high-tech labor/management cooperation. According to Pat Hill-Hubbard, senior vice |
president of the American Electronics Association,
"employees have become decision-makers, and management
has practically disappeared." Doug Henton,
representing Joint Venture: Silicon Valley, an
industry/government policy group, was even more blunt.
"Unions as they have existed in the past are no longer
relevant," he said. "Labor law of 40 years ago is not
appropriate to 20th century economics."
In the high-performance workplace, asserted Phuli Siddiqi, an Intel worker who gave part of her company's presentation, work teams give employees a voice. She described "worker ownership of projects and products," |
and the company's employee recognition program, "Pat on
the Back."
In the early years of the electronics industry, companies paid relatively low wages, but they attempted to equal, and sometimes surpass, union benefits, providing medical and dental plans and even sick leave. Hewlett-Packard even promised never to lay off workers. Today, however, permanent jobs are being abolished. Half the work force in many large electronics plants works for temporary agencies, without any benefits, and at much lower salaries. "The company always told us |
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they had to be competitive,"
said Romie Manan, a worker at National Semiconductor
Corp.'s non-union Santa Clara plant:
"Increasing the company's profitability, they said, would increase our job security. That was the purpose of our workteams. Then the company took the ideas contributed by the experienced work force in Santa Clara, which they got through the team meetings, and used them to organize new labs with inexperienced workers in Arlington, Texas, where wages are much lower. The experienced workers lost their jobs. The team meetings stole our experience and ideas, and didn't give |
us any power to protect our jobs and families.27"
Manan lost his own job, as did more than 30,000 semiconductor workers on production lines in Silicon Valley in the last 10 years. Through its 50-year existence, the semiconductor industry has successfully prevented workers from organizing unions by combining the lure of labor- management cooperation with the threat of job loss. This model of unionbusting does not depend on outside consultants, but on the expertise of companies' own human relations departments. The strategy is less |
reactive than the traditional approach and is in place
on a constant basis, whether organizing attempts are in
progress or not.
The ideologues of this approach consider union organizing drives a punishment for companies which have failed. Kirby Dyess, Intel's vice president of human relations, says that when workers organize unions, "it is a failure of management." Although many of the new structures for labor/management cooperation are currently illegal, corporations are lobbying hard to change that. After the Republican sweep of the 1994 elections, | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||

Romie Manan, workplace activist in the semiconductor
industry and union activist in the Philippines.
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both the Senate and House passed
the Team Act, which weakens the portion of the NLRA
Section 8(a)(2) which prohibits company unions.
Looking for labor support in 1996, President Clinton
vetoed the bill. Congressional observers, however, think
that its reintroduction is still possible.
A "UNION PROOF" WORK FORCE |
This is also a spin on old ideas. John Sayles' film Matewan, for
example, recalls the effort by coal operators in the
1920s to bring immigrants of one nationality or race to
scab on the strikes of another.
In Los Angeles, cleaning contractors in office buildings in the mid-1980s dumped their largely African American union work force, shed their union contracts, and hired immigrants. |
Today in the Midwest and Southeast, the burgeoning
poultry industry is using the same strategy. Some of the
largest food corporations in the world, such as ConAgra,
systematically recruit immigrant workers. They believe
that an immigrant work force has several advantages: In
the eyes of managers, immigrant workers not only have
low wage expectations, but are less likely to support
unions because they face an unknown and unfriendly
environment, immigration problems, and are ignorant of
their rights.
While profitable in the short run, however, using |
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immigrants as a bulwark against unions may prove to be
many companies' undoing. In Los Angeles in 1991,
hundreds of immigrant janitors were attacked by police
as they marched for the union in Century City. Public
outrage was so great that the building owners and
contractors were forced to sign new union agreements.
The battle put Justice for Janitors on the national
labor radar screen.
Immigrant construction workers in southern California were also brought in to replace a higher-wage work force |
in the 1980s. But a movement organized largely by
immigrants themselves first struck drywall contractors
in 1992, and then framing contractors in 1995. They won
union contracts for thousands of workers in some of the
first bottom-up, grassroots organizing drives in the
construction industry since the 1930s.
Many immigrants bring militant traditions with them from their home countries, and have high expectations of social and economic justice. The Los Angeles Manufacturing Action |
Project has established a new
center for immigrant-based organizing, to support
mobilizing drives in the largest concentration of
industrial workers in the world.
With the new welfare reform bill and preexisting programs to force welfare recipients into the job market, employers have seen another source of a potentially "union-proof" work force. Cities have already begun looking at workfare recipients as a pool of low-cost labor that can replace unionized employees. Last August, negotiating with a gun to its head, New |
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York's Transit Union was forced to agree that 500 union
jobs cleaning subways would be eliminated through
attrition, while hundreds of workfare recipients took
over those tasks. While a few workfare recipients
may eventually get permanent jobs, that transition was
clearly not what the Metropolitan Transit Authority had
in mind. Its goal is a work force of subway cleaners
paid the equivalent of minimum wage for doing the same
job that union employees now perform for a much higher
one.
New York City uses a growing number of workfare |
recipients and will expand its workfare work force to
60,000 by 1998. Many of the city's unions have
criticized the municipal workers' union, the American
Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees
(AFSCME) District Council 37, for not mounting a more
aggressive challenge to the city's growing workfare
program. Stung by the criticism, District Executive
Director Stanley Hill finally called for a moratorium on
expansion beyond the present 35,000 enrollees.
Public employee unions have historically supported jobs for welfare recipients and unemployed people. But |
workfare, they say, offers no solution, because there's
no guarantee of an eventual permanent job paying a
liveable wage. "When you flood the labor market with
workfare recipients," explains Fran Bernstein from
AFSCME's national office, "you see enormous wage
depression for the bottom third of the work force.
That's intentional."
What unions want is a basic bill of rights for workfare recipients, including the right to the same wage and treatment given other employees, the right to organize unions, and protection from unfair and arbitrary |
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discipline.
Private employers are also eyeing the possibilities. Marriott Corp., which made one of the first efforts to bring workfare into its work force, emphasizes that it supports and counsels recipients about problems such as tardiness, rather than simply disciplining or firing them as it does with other workers. But for workfare recipients, the weekly benefit check is all that stands between them and the streets. That's an advantage to a company like Marriott, which has mounted |
a scorched-earth fight to keep its regular employees
from organizing unions. Employers contend recipients are
not workers at all, and have no right to organize or
file complaints against health and safety dangers or
discrimination.
In September, President Clinton urged expansion of workfare in the private sector. "We cannot create enough public-service jobs to hire these folks," he said, adding that "this has basically got to be a private-sector show." But with no guarantee about |
maintaining existing wage
levels or protecting the rights of workfare recipients,
welfare reform pits them against currently-employed
workers in a race to the bottom. It promises to
transform jobs that can support families into ones that
can't, and to rob the people who perform them of
security, job rights, and their dignity as workers.
CAN THE BUSTERS BE BEATEN? |
| It's clear that employers have their eyes on unions' most innovative strategies. Following the election of John Sweeney in October 1995, the No. 1 law firm on the AFL-CIO's list, Jackson, Lewis, Schnitzler and Krupman, gave seminars to drill employers on the "The AFL-CIO's `Union Yes' Campaign." The conference prospectus noted the increase in the AFL-CIO's organizing budget,the rising interest in "militant and creative new organizing tactics," including "obstruct the economy" and "go to jail," and advertised sessions on the peer review committee strategy and the Electromation case, which bans modern company unions. |
Like unions, unionbusters learn from experience. After
years of seeing the United Farm Workers hold big marches
during organizing drives, for instance, last year
strawberry growers in Watsonville, California, organized
their own march of workers opposed to the union.
Understanding the importance of public opinion, growers
hired their own PR agency, the Dolphin Group of Los
Angeles, to manage their image.
Direct activity by anti-union consultants and law firms, |
and their strikebreaking guards, is a big obstacle to
the survival and growth of unions. But in the long term,
the new face of unionbusting may prove to have an even
greater effect. The newest and fastest growing
industries electronics, biotechnology, and others
have developed an anti-union structure which workers
have yet to crack on a large scale. The use of chronic
unemployment and social policies such as welfare
and immigration reform pits workers against each other
in desperate competition.
Fighting against unionbusting, therefore, is not simply |
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a matter of using more intelligent and innovative
tactics. Labor has to fight for a social agenda that
includes the repeal of welfare reform, and supports
racial and gender equality and equity between immigrant
and native-born workers.
Organizing the unemployed may prove to be as important
as organizing in the workplace. |
necessary, as is a commitment to using more
sophisticated and militant strategies, clearly the 15
million US union members must become more involved in
union activity. That requires structural changes within unions, increasing the involvement of ordinary members in decision-making, and reducing the often-wide gulf that separates leadership from rank-and-file. In US labor history, large-scale union organizing has always been part of a broader social movement fighting for the interests of all |
workers, organized and
unorganized, employed and unemployed. The
They projected a vision of social and economic change that went
far beyond, and directly in contradiction to, the prevailing wisdom of the time. |
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of strikebreakers, and the lack of
legal rights which faced workers in the 1920s were swept
away a decade later.
The upsurge among millions of American workers, |
radicalized by the Depression and left-wing activism, forced corporate acceptance of labor for the first time in the country's history. That activism mobilized the power of workers to overcome obstacles not dissimilar to those of the present. They projected a vision of social and economic change that went far beyond, and directly in contradiction to, |
the prevailing wisdom of its time.
The current changes in labor may be the beginning of something as large and profound. If they are, then the obstacles erected by present-day unionbusters can become a historical relic as quickly as did those of an earlier era. |
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